Church, State, and Warfare: The Orthodox Church and the War in Ukraine

How the Orthodox Church became Weaponized in the Russian-Ukrainian War.

“President Joe Biden walks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at St. Michael’s Cathedral” courtesy of Adam Schlutz licensed under CC by 1.

In August of this year, the Ukrainian parliament voted to ban the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOCMP) from operating within its borders due to fears of its ties to the Kremlin. This vote represents only one of the many legislative measures Ukraine has taken to combat the influence of the Russian government through the church.

As responses to these actions pour in from high-profile  actors such as Russian Patriarch Kyrill, Senator J.D Vance, and Dmitry Peskov, it is more imperative now than ever to critically understand a largely overlooked factor in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: the Orthodox Church in Russia and the Post-Soviet States.

The history of Orthodoxy for much of Eastern Europe is one interwoven with Russian hegemony and dominance, as can be seen by studying the once-independent churches of Georgia and Ukraine. As one of the first Christened countries, the Georgian Orthodox Church predates Russia’s own church by nearly 500 years. Despite its historical establishment, Tsarist Russia gained control of the church during the 19th century, although the church is now independent. Russia and Ukraine’s respective churches have long been intertwined, with the Russian Orthodox Church originally being located in Kyiv, Ukraine’s modern day capital, before moving to Moscow. Ukrainians have long sought to have a church independent of the Russian Patriarch, successfully separating themselves twice: once during the early 1900s, and more recently splitting from the mainline UOCMP church in 2019.  

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these historic church feuds have risen to prominence, but with a larger political backdrop. While many international actors have focused on the geopolitical implications of the war, Putin’s war rhetoric has often drifted into a more philosophical message of Russia’s need to spread traditional values to foreign nations. In efforts to provide backing for such rhetoric, Russia has mobilized its control over the Russian Orthodox Church, whose website reads more similarly to a Kremlin-backed NGO than a church.

With Russian Patriarch Kirill of Moscow officially labeling the war in Ukraine a “Holy War,” it should come as no surprise that Ukrainian government officials have adopted a skeptical stance toward any religious organizations with alleged ties to the ROC, including its own Orthodox Church. However, such aggressive actions by the Ukrainian parliament such as banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church highlight the nuances of religion in warfare. Even with their deep political ties, these churches remain primarily religious institutions in the eyes of the populace. The recent ban inevitably alienates a plurality of Ukranian Christians, as the UOCMP was previously the largest religious institution in the country. 

Highlighting the controversial nature of the ban, some of the strongest critics of Russia’s invasion have spoken out against the legislation, including Georgian Patriarch Ilia II and Pope Francis, the latter proclaiming that “churches are not to be touched” by lawmakers. Given that both of these figures have avidly decried Russia’s humanitarian faults and the controversial statements of the ROC Patriarch, these strong reactions show that not all organizations can be viewed through a mere political lens. With the UOCMP far predating any recent Ukrainian parliament, people are likely to still find a sense of personal and national identity within the church despite the government’s suspicions of Russian influence. Even with the threat of such influence, lawmakers may be playing directly into Putin’s narrative of foreign countries falling away from traditional values by restricting the most influential entity of such values: the church itself.